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Bandwidth depletion Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack can impact the propagation 
of a mined block in the Bitcoin blockchain network. On Bitcoin Proof-of-Work (PoW) 
consensus several machines try to resolve an expensive cryptographic puzzle faster 
than anyone else and succeed to mine a valid block. Despite a DoS attack impedes 
one machine to propagate its mined block allowing it to become valid for most peers, 
there will be several other peers to resolve the puzzle in time, hence the blockchain 
will continue to grow. However, from the perspective of the owner of the attacked 
machine, this can be critical because it will not receive a mining reward. This chapter 
covers such an attack in the Lisk blockchain that utilizes the Delegated Proof of Stake 
(DPoS) consensus mechanism. A mitigation strategy was created based on two tools 
that I have created allowing a delegate account to be configured in more than one 
node, allowing to forge a block even when one of its nodes is under DoS attack. Also, 
the transaction flood DoS attack is explored, and a mitigation strategy was created 
for a specific sidechain in the Lisk ecosystem. The mitigation strategy identifies spam 
transactions and rejects them to be included on the Lisk nodes transaction pool, 
hence they will not be propagated into the blockchain. Towards the end, I evaluated 
scenarios and mitigation strategies created for each attack demonstrating solutions 
for several scenarios.
Keywords: Lisk, DoS, PoW, DPoS, bandwidth depletion attack,  
transaction flood attack, mitigation strategy, dynamic programming
1. Introduction
The necessity of a solution to allow transactions between peers without a 
third-party authority was the main reason for the Bitcoin [1] blockchain creation. 
The Bitcoin whitepaper demonstrates this necessity as follows: “Commerce on the 
Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as 
trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well 
enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the 
trust based model. Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, 
since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation 
increases transaction costs, limiting the minimum practical transaction size and 
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cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions, and there is a broader cost 
in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for nonreversible services. 
With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must be wary 
of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise 
need. A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and 
payment uncertainties can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but 
no mechanism exists to make payments over a communications channel without 
a trusted party. What is needed is an electronic payment system based on crypto-
graphic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact directly 
with each other without the need for a trusted third party. Transactions that are 
computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud, and 
routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers [1]”.
Blockchain technology promises to redefine trust in distributed systems by 
serving as a tamper-proof and transparent public ledger that is easily verifiable 
and difficult to corrupt [2]. Hence, it is utilized a consensus protocol that allows 
participants, for example, all copies of the blockchain, to agree on a unique version 
of the true state of the network without a third authority [3]. Despite blockchain 
are publicly verifiable and tamper-proof, each node on a public blockchain is a 
computational node that is exposed on the Internet by default, therefore, exposed 
to denial-of-service attacks or distributed denial of service attacks (DoS/DDoS), 
it will be used DoS for DoS or DDoS attacks from here. On Delegated Proof of 
Stake (DPoS) consensus, a consensus composed by a numeric quantity of nodes 
configured with delegate accounts, unique accounts responsible to forge blocks and 
change the state of the network, each node configured with a delegate account has a 
determined slot of time to forge a block in the network [4].
This chapter exposes two types of DoS attacks that can have a great impact on 
the Lisk Blockchain network. One attack is called a bandwidth depletion attack that 
sends several UDP packets at high speed against a computational node. Hence, at 
the moment a delegate account configured on a single node is successfully attacked 
by a DoS during its time slot for forging a block, then it cannot forge a block during 
that specific amount of time exclusively allocated to it. The second type of attack is 
called transaction flood attack and the main purpose is to send spam transactions 
that are valid in format, but they have small value and fee costs. The goal of such 
an attack is to fulfill a queue that resides on each node of the Lisk blockchain called 
transaction pool. When the transaction pool of a node is full then the node can-
not accept any other transaction from anyone in the blockchain, this way all new 
transactions created and sent to any node are rejected.
A solution for the bandwidth depletion problem was already discussed in [4] 
and this chapter brings an update on the solution. However, the necessity of a solu-
tion for the transaction flood attack is discussed also in [5] and the results demon-
strate the resilience of the mitigation strategy that was implemented against such 
attacks. It was shown two different types of a flood attack, one more expensive, it 
sends a transaction with proper relay fee and mining fee that would make them first 
selected for a block not allowing other transactions to be selected first, and another 
one attack cheaper and powerful in Bitcoin ecosystem. The latter was based in send 
several transactions with a proper relay fee but a small mining fee, this way such 
transactions were not selected for a block and always went to mem pool, a queue in 
Bitcoin.
The necessity for a solution to mitigate transaction flood attacks in the sidechain 
context and bandwidth depletion attack were the main reason for writing strategies 
to such problems.
This chapter is organized as follow: Section 2 abords related works, Section 
3 presents Lisk version 2.3.8 and brings the first look at Lisk version 5, Section 4 
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details the impact of DoS attacks in Lisk blockchain, Section 5 demonstrates the 
strategies to mitigate bandwidth depletion and transaction flood DoS attacks, 
Section 6 demonstrates results, and Section 7 concludes the chapter.
2. Related works
In the context of Blockchain and transaction flood mem pool attacks, there are 
some papers, and it was identified [5] as relevant for this chapter. It analyzes two 
specific ways to perform flood attacks in the Bitcoin network. One is based on send-
ing several transactions with appropriate relay fees and relevant mining fee to allow 
spam transactions to be included in a block not allowing real transactions from real 
users be included in a block, hence the transaction from real users go to mem pool. 
In this form of attack, the mem pool starts to grow as a valid transaction is not been 
chosen by miners since the spam transaction has more relevant fees to be included 
in a block. However, this is an expensive attack, and a transaction fee already dif-
ficult in this scenario. The second mem pool attack [5] states that spam transactions 
are created by Sybil accounts with a relay fee above the minimum relay fee required 
for a transaction, however, the transactions mining fee is below the minimum fee 
to be included directly in a block, this way transactions go to mem pool and stay 
there. Also, mem pool size grows, and for a real user to create a transaction and have 
it included in a block it is needed to include a relevant price for the transaction fee. 
After the same procedures, it was discovered that it increases Bitcoin transaction 
fee price by time and keeps other transactions away from been included in a block. 
Finally, [5] proposes a solution for such a scenario that can detect transactions 
spams and reject properly such transactions.
[6] presents an empirical study of DoS attacks on the Bitcoin ecosystem, it 
was identified that most of the attacks occur on currency exchanges, then mining 
pools. Also, it was analyzed how was constructed the dataset of DoS registers and 
currency exchanges that already suffered attacks and took countermeasures of 
anti-DoS protection. Among the conclusion was presented that big mining pools are 
bigger targets for DoS attacks than smaller mining pools especially because of the 
mining race on Bitcoin. A mining pool can launch a DoS attack against other mining 
pools if it realizes that the concurrent mining pool can have mined a block and tries 
to spread it into the network.
3. Lisk Blockchain
The Lisk Blockchain utilizes DPoS as its consensus mechanism to forge blocks 
and updates the state of the network [2]. DPoS is a consensus that elects the top 101 
active delegate accounts based on the higher-weight voted delegates. Only delegate 
accounts can vote for delegate accounts. The voting mechanism in Lisk 2.x can be 









Lisk nodes communicate between them using a P2P network based on transac-
tion propagation and block propagation. Each node on Lisk utilizes Javascript 
Object Notation (JSON) objects with blocks and transactions compressed to 
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communicate [4]. The P2P networks enable scalability on the network, avoid a sin-
gle point of failure, and prevent a small group of participants controls the network 
[3]. Also, a consensus mechanism allows establishing a new state in the network. 
On every 10 seconds, a block is forged on the network including a maximum of 25 
transactions in it and only delegate accounts can forge a block in Lisk.
The 5 components of a blockchain that are important to achieve a consensus 
protocol are: Block proposal that generates blocks and attaches essential generation 
proofs, Information propagation that disseminates blocks and transactions across 
the network, Block validation that checks blocks for generation proofs and the 
transactions within, Block finalization that reaches consensus on certain blocks, 
and Incentive mechanisms that encourage honest participants and drive the system 
to move forward [7].
3.1 Delegate accounts
Delegate accounts are the unique accounts that can forge a block in the Lisk 
network. To forge a block each delegate account among the 101 top active delegate 
accounts has a specific time slot of 10 seconds [2]. There is no competition between 
delegate accounts during a time slot, each time slot belongs to a single delegate 
account and only that specific delegate account can forge a block at that moment.
3.2 Transaction pool
Transaction pool is a queue that resides in a Lisk blockchain node [2]. By 
default, this queue has a capacity of 1000 transactions plus 1000 multi-signature 
transactions. Any transaction created and broadcasted to a Lisk node is stored 
in its transaction pool. When the moment to forge a block arrives for a delegate 
account, it gets transactions from its transaction pool and includes them in a 
block. In Lisk version 2.x the transaction pool queue sorts transaction by their 
timestamp.
3.3 Lisk sidechain SDK 2.3.8
“Lisk sidechain is an exclusive blockchain that accepts custom transactions 
developed with the Lisk transaction library. Despite that a sidechain accepts only 
transactions supported by the Lisk blockchain network and custom transactions 
registered in the sidechain, this is a remarkably interesting characteristic espe-
cially because the sidechain does not allow transactions from different sidechains. 
Furthermore, the transaction space on a sidechain block is reserved only for the 
custom transactions supported by itself and the transactions supported by the 
Lisk blockchain. Each node in the sidechain network executes and accepts  
the same type of transaction. However, until the version used in this paper, 2.3.8, 
there is no communication yet between Lisk blockchain and the Restaurant 
sidechain [8]”.
Labels Definition
X Amount of LSK voter holds
i voter
n Amount of voters
Table 1. 
Vote mechanism formula in Lisk version 2.X.
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3.4 A first look in Lisk SDK 5.x
Lisk introduces, on version 3.0, Lisk-BFT, a customizable fault-tolerant 
framework of consensus algorithms from the famous Paxos protocol [9] to 
improve efficiency and resistance against Byzantine faults [4]. The Lisk-BFT 
protocol is a forkful protocol where there is no requirement for a block proposer 
to achieve consensus before adding more blocks to the block tree, for more 
information see [10]. Many improvements were added in Lisk SDK 5.x, like an 
increase of block size to allow a capacity of 128 transactions instead of the only 
25 transactions of version 2.x. Also, the increase of the size of the transaction 
pool, the inclusion of dynamic fees on transfer transactions, and much more can 
be verified in [11].
4. Impact of DoS in Lisk Blockchain
This section starts by bringing two types of DoS attacks that can directly impact 
the performance of Lisk Blockchain. These DoS attacks are bandwidth depletion 
and transaction flood attacks in the transaction pool.
4.1 Denial-of-service bandwidth depletion attack
Bandwidth depletion attacks can have a great impact on blockchain applica-
tion owners in the Lisk environment and on delegate accounts. This affirmation 
is important especially because of DPoS consensus mechanisms in Lisk. In DPoS, 
delegates are the unique accounts that could forge a block in Lisk, hence if a node 
configured with an active delegate account is attacked during its time slot and 
prevents the forge of a new block then the blockchain will lose at least 10 seconds. 
A delegate time slot is attached to one specific delegate, and only it can forge a 
block. Another problem caused by a DoS attack against a delegate account is the 
transactions accumulated in the transaction pool, in this period, no block with 
transactions can be created during the time slot of the attacked delegate. Any 
new transactions created by users will arrive in the transaction pool increasing its 
occupancy rate.
Figure 1 demonstrates a use case of a Lisk application that allows users to request 
food online, and each food request represents a single transaction in the blockchain. 
Figure 2 demonstrates a bandwidth depletion attack.
Table 2 shows a scenario of transaction requests in the Lisk application and 
how much it can be affected by a DoS attack during its most important period 
of usage.
Figure 1. 
Users requesting food online on a Lisk application. Each food request generates a transaction to be submitted 
into the blockchain.
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4.2 Transaction flood attack
Transaction flood attack consists of sending an immense quantity of transac-
tions that necessarily do not are related to the business itself. For example, using 
the same use case of Restaurants and food requests, a transaction flood attack 
would consist of sending several transactions of small value that are not food 
requests, they are just transactions with small amount value, but in large volume 
to surpass the capacity of a block and increase the number of transactions into 
transaction pool until it gets full. After achieving the capacity of the transaction 
pool, no other transaction created by any user will be accepted in the transaction 
pool, they will just be refused and discarded not getting a chance to be included 
in a block. Figure 3 demonstrates a scenario that the transaction pool is full, 
and valid transactions created by a user online on the restaurant website are 
discarded.
Table 3 shows a scenario of transaction requests in the Lisk application and how 
much it can be affected by a transaction flood DoS attack during its most important 
period of usage.
The next section will investigate mitigation strategies for bandwidth depletion 
DoS attacks and flood transaction attacks.
5. Strategies to mitigate DoS attacks on Lisk Blockchain
In this Section, it will be presented the mitigation strategies for transaction flood 
attacks and bandwidth depletion attacks.
Figure 2. 
Bandwidth depletion DoS attack against a delegate account configured on a Lisk node [4].
Labels Restaurant 1 Restaurant 2
Number of tx 50 90
maximum Request time without dos 20 seconds 40 seconds
Dos duration against 1 delegate account 15 minutes 15 minutes
total waiting time of a user 30 seconds 50 seconds
Table 2. 
DoS attack on a single delegate account affects waiting time. Since a delegate account forges only a single 
block in a round of 16 minutes, the waiting time during a DoS increases at least by 10 seconds. The most 
impacted in this scenario is the attacked delegate account that cannot receive a reward as it did not forge a 
block.
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5.1 Transaction flood DoS mitigation solution
The proposed solution for transaction flood DoS attack is based on the use 
of dynamic programming to verify if a transaction was already sent before and 
to verify if a transaction has specific characteristics of a valid transaction in the 
context of the restaurant business. It was used a use case of a restaurant sidechain to 
explain the flood transaction mitigation strategy.
5.1.1 Restaurant use case mitigation solution
In a restaurant sidechain [8], it is possible to request food online using a specific 
type of transaction, the food transaction type. This specific type of transaction has 
a unique identifier for any transaction and a specific transaction type code. Despite 
Figure 3. 
The transaction pool capacity of 1000 transactions is already full. Any new transaction that arrives on a node is 
rejected until the transaction pool has some space after including transactions on new blocks.
Labels Restaurant 1 Restaurant 2
Number of tx 50 90
maximum Request time without dos 20 seconds 40 seconds
Transaction flood Dos duration with full capacity 
loaded
15 minutes 15 minutes
total waiting time of a user 15 minutes +20 seconds 15 minutes +40 seconds
Table 3. 
Transaction flood DoS attack on blockchain. When the transaction pool capacity is full no other transaction 
can be included in it. Sporadically, a valid transaction from a user can be added into the transaction pool 
by chance because of the normal flow of block creations by forgers and the inclusion of transactions from the 
transaction pool into a block. The most impacted in this DoS scenario are users, applications, exchanges that 
cannot include transactions because any transaction is rejected.
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that a sidechain can accept regular transfer transaction types, from a restaurant 
business perspective, only the food transaction type should be accepted to buy food 
in the sidechain. Hence, any spam transaction that is not a food transaction should 
be rejected. Also, if spam transactions are specified as food transaction type, the 
food type is verified based on another transaction type called menu transaction 
(MT). The MT type lists all foods accepted by a restaurant with detailed informa-
tion as price, name, description of all foods. The transaction id is verified to not 
allow the same transaction id to be used several times into the same block in the 
blockchain. Finally, spam transactions are also validated in amount and fees. Sender 
balance is verified before a transaction is spread to other nodes in the blockchain, 
this reduces the verification impact in case of spam attacks. Any transaction that 
does not fit in the specified criteria is considered a spam transaction and therefore 
rejected by the solution. Despite this solution was utilized in a sidechain, it can be 
adapted to be used directly in a blockchain.
5.1.2 Dynamic programming approach in the solution
To allow the success of the proposed solution it was specified a threshold 
number of transactions to be verified for transaction flood attack. This is important 
because the transaction pool of any node has the size of 1000 transactions capacity 
by default. To allow a response in time is important to specify a threshold, this way 
the problem becomes an NP-Complete problem to solve. If no threshold is specified, 
then as much spam transaction arrives harder the problem becomes to solve, and a 
solution to mitigate such a scenario becomes more expensive to verify.
5.2 Bandwidth depletion DoS mitigation solution
The proposed solution of bandwidth depletion DoS attack mitigates it on an 
active delegate account configured on monitored nodes of Lisk blockchain as 
published in [4]. The solution uses tools to monitor the synchronization level 
of correct blocks in blockchain between connected nodes and allows a delegate 
account to forge a block and spread it into blockchain nodes even when a specific 
monitored node is under bandwidth depletion attack. This specific synchroniza-
tion level is called Broadhash Consensus and is an aggregate rolling hash of the last 
5 blocks on de node data storage. When a specific tool called Forge Verifier (FV) 
detects that a monitored node is under attack, it verifies between all monitored 
nodes which one has the best synchronization level of blocks in the blockchain, and 
then it selects the best node for forging at that moment setting the forging status of 
the best-synchronized node to true and all the other monitored nodes forging status 
to false. Hence, when a forging slot of a configured delegate account arrives then it 
can forge a block even when another monitored node is under bandwidth depletion 
attack. Furthermore, the solution allows the continuity of block generation by the 
configured delegate account without wasting the slot time allocated to it on each 
forging round.
5.2.1 Architectures elements
For the mitigation strategy proposed in [4], there are 3 main architectural 
elements. The blockchain node API allows to perform HTTP requests to know 
the synchronization level of a monitored node and therefore allows the FV tool to 
specify the forging node at that moment. The FV tool continuously monitors nodes 
configured in a file, called monitor.json, based on synchronization level, then it 
sends a request to a tool called Forger Lisk (FL). The new possibility in the FV tool 
9
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is to configure, in the monitor.json file, the maximum waiting time that FV should 
wait to retrieve the synchronization level from the monitored nodes specified there. 
For example, if FV is monitoring 3 nodes, and the maximum waiting time is speci-
fied to 10 seconds, then FV requests each node for its synchronization level, which 
goes from 0 to 100, and all monitored nodes should respond in 10 seconds other-
wise they will be considered not accessible nodes by FV. After wait 10 seconds for an 
answer, FV will choose a node from the nodes that responded to the synchroniza-
tion level request to be a forger in that round. After FV performs this step, it sends a 
request for an update to the FL tool, the goat is to update the forging status of moni-
tored nodes through nodes API where the FL tool resides. FL tool exists because it 
is only possible to change status on any Lisk node through local requests. Hence, 
FV can reside on any computer that has access to the internet, however, FL needs to 
reside in the same computational node of a monitored Lisk node (Figure 4).
6. Performance evaluation
The contribution of this chapter was performed evaluating both DoS scenarios 
and mitigation solutions in a sidechain network for the transaction flood DoS attack 
and in the Testnet network for the bandwidth depletion attack. The tools utilized, 
links, and GitHub source code can be found in Appendices Section.
6.1 Transaction flood sidechain performance evaluation
The sidechain results were performed using Lisk SDK 2.3.8 version, 101 delegate 
accounts, a backend representing one restaurant connected to sidechain nodes, 
a web application connected to the restaurant backend, a script to generate spam 
transactions and send them to the restaurant backend. In this solution, the restau-
rant backend provides the mitigation strategy on its API method (Table 4).
6.1.1 Testing environment
The Lisk SDK 2.3.8 was utilized to create the restaurant sidechain and it was 
executed in all blockchain nodes. The backend was developed in nodeJS and con-
nected with sidechain nodes. Web application representing restaurant website was 
developed using React technology.
Figure 4. 
Architecture elements of bandwidth depletion mitigation solution [4].
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6.1.2 Evaluation and use cases
A transaction flood attack was performed using a valid balance transfer transac-
tion that was sent every 100 ms against the restaurant backend. During the attack, it 
was accessed the Lisk restaurant website and performed a valid food request online 
successfully. The video was recorded and included in Appendices Section.
6.2 Bandwidth depletion Testnet performance evaluation
The Testnet results were provided already by [4] and are commented on here. 
Testnet delegate accounts can be found at Lisk Testnet explorer. The Lisk version 
utilized was 2.3.x, also it was utilized a new relic tool to record monitored nodes API 
requests and it was calculated response time for API nodes.
6.2.1 Testing environment
“The Lisk Core version 2.1.3-RC.0 was used on all monitored nodes during the tests 
on Testnet network and it implements Lisk protocol. It was used Visual Studio Code to 
implement the tools FL and FV and they were executed on NodeJS version 10+. The cho-
sen network for the tests was Testnet. It was assumed as a premise that bandwidth deple-
tion DoS attacks using UDP protocol against one of the monitored nodes by the FV tool. 
There are some tools and sites that can perform such types of attacks. Also, videos were 
recorded, calculated average of requests per minute, and response time was monitored 
with Newrelic. Furthermore, it was captured Pcap files allowing network data to be 
analyzed with the Wireshark tool or reproduced with Tcpreplay for better comprehen-
sion of the tools developed, the solution strategy, and their behavior on Lisk [4]”.
6.2.2 Performance analysis
In the following scenario, it was tested bandwidth depletion attack against one 
of 4 monitored nodes. Even with the attack against a delegate account configured 
in one of all 4 monitored nodes, it was possible to forge blocks with a single forger 
node while the other ones were updated to be non-forgers. Also, a video demonstra-
tion of a similar attack was performed and recorded, it is available in Appendices 
Section. Table 5 shows the result [4]:
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In Table 4 above, it is possible to understand use case test scenarios performed with DoS attack and mitigation 
solution.
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7. Conclusions
This paper presented a strategy to mitigate transaction flood denial-of-service 
attacks reducing overhead in the blockchain, and allowing the spread of valid 
transactions between nodes. Also, it was presented a strategy to mitigate band-
width depletion denial of service attack on Lisk allowing, in most situations, the 
continuity of blocks been forged by a delegate account reducing the probability 
of creating forks and loss of forging block time slots. As a result of the analysis, it 
was observed that a restaurant online solution continued to provide service even 
during the spam transaction attack. Also, it was observed that during the band-
width depletion denial-of-service attack monitored nodes attended the requests 
from FV while attacked nodes struggle to respond in time. For future works, I 
expect to adapt proposed solutions to the new Lisk SDK version 5 with Lisk-BFT 
consensus.
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